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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE W. PRESTON 
* 
Plaintiff and * Appellant 
* 
vs. 
* APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
LORNA A. PRESTON 
* No. 17597 
Defendant and * Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce brought by the Plaintiff to 
dissolve a marriage entered into between the parties on the 2nd 
day of October, 1972. No children were born of the marriage and 
issues on appeal involve the settlement of property between the 
parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was first heard in the District Court for the First 
Judicial District in and for Cache County before the Honorable 
Calvin Gould on the 27th day of March, 1980. Judge Gould entered 
a decree of divorce, reserved all matters of property settlement 
for trial upon the merits and restrained the Defendant, Lorna A. 
Preston, from removing all property acquired during marriage from 
the Plaintiff's home. The trial on the merits was held on the 
23rd day of December, 1980 before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist. 
Judge Wahlquist awarded to each party the property they held 
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prior to marriage including houses, funds and other personal 
property and required each party to assume the debts on the 
property they received. 
The Court without making any finding granted to the 
Defendant all property she acquired by inheritance or gift 
during marriage. 
The trial Court granted to the Defendant a lien in the 
amount of $17,000.00 upon a cabin, constructed during marriage 
upon land inherited by the Plaintiff prior to marriage without 
giving Plaintiff credit for contributions made to the construc-
tion from funds he had acquired before marriage. 
The Court awarded all personal property to the Defendant 
which she had removed from the residence contrary to the order 
of Judge Gould, with the exception that Plaintiff was awarded a 
silver spoon, dining room furniture, tools, his rifle and his 
mother's diamond ring. The Court expressly found that the 
Defendant was not entitled to either alimony or attorney's fees 
and decreed accordingly. Notwithstanding that finding, however, 
the Court awarded the personal property to the Defendant in 
"lieu of any further alimony and/or attorney's fees". 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks a modification of the Judgment of the 
Trial court as follows: 
A. An award crediting Plaintiff for his contribution to 
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the cabin of $9,310.93 equaling approximately 50% of the construc-
tion costs as property owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage 
to be deducted (together with its appreciation) from the market 
value of the cabin prior to any division of the equity between 
the parties. 
B. For an award to the Plaintiff of 50% interest in the 
farm land and cattle acquired by the parties in the name of the 
Defendant during the marriage of the parties, the figure of 50% 
being the same figure used by the Trial Court in dividing the 
equity in the cabin at Bear Lake. 
c. For an award equitably dividing the personal property 
of the parties removed from Plaintiff's residence by the 
Defendant contrary to and in violation of Judge Gould's Order of 
April 4, 1980. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties in this action were married on October 2, 1972 
and were divorced on April 4, 1980. The Plaintiff has been 
married on one prior occasion and has 3 children as a result of 
that marriage. The Defendant had been married on two prior 
occasions and has three children from the two prior marriages. 
The Defendant at the time of the marriage of the parties was not 
receiving alimony but was receiving child support from her two 
prior husbands. There were no children born as issue of the 
marriage. 
The Plaintiff brought into the marriage property as follows: 
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real estate located in Rich County, Utah (TR-27) which was own~ 
by Plaintiff and his brother as tenants in common; a residence 
in Logan, Utah which was owned jointly with Plaintiff's first 
wife, Jane P. Preston, a boat, car, partnership interest in a 
law firm, retirement benefits from his employer as a deputy 
county attorney and also from his law firm, stocks ana bonds 
and a savings account. This property was awarded to the 
Plaintiff. 
The Defendant brought into the marriage, a house in Logan, 
Utah, savings accounts in the approximate amount of $12,000.00 
an automobile and a trust deed and note from her first husband 
with a face amount of $65,000.00, part of which had been paid 
(TR-28) prior to marriage. This property was awarded to the 
Defendant. 
During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff remained 
employed and supported the Defendant and her children to the 
extent that he paid for all living expenses over and above chiM 
support payments, when made, and when they were not made he pro-
vided all of the support for the children. (TR-25) The 
Plaintiff and the Defendant filed a joint income tax return but 
any tax due on the Defendant's income was paid from the funds 
generated by the Plaintiff. (TR-33) 
During the course of the marriage the Plaintiff was instru-
mental in collecting for the Defendant the balance due of the 
note secured by a trust deed in the amount of $28,000.00 which 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
funds were thereafter delivered to the Defendant and invested by 
the Defendant, and none of these funds were used by the Plaintiff. 
Nevertheless, the Plaintiff's income paid the taxes on the net 
income. At the time of the divorce the Defendant had in excess 
of $43,000.00 cash in her name or available to her. (TR 118-119) 
During the course of the marriage each party prepared a 
will. The Defendant's will provided that all property would 
pass to her children. The Plaintiff's will provided, initially 
that his property pass to his children. Following a specific 
request by the Defendant, the Defendant was included into the 
Plaintiff's Will as a beneficiary. (TR-53) 
The Plaintiff and the Defendant acquired various items of 
personal property during their marriage which were located in 
the residence and at the cabin. The Defendant, immediately 
following the separation, removed all of her property and some 
of the Plaintiff's property from the cabin. An order was 
obtained from Judge Gould restraining the Defendant from 
removing from the Plaintiff's residence any property acquired by 
the parties during their marriage pending a division of the pro-
perty by the Court. The Defendant upon leaving the residence, 
when ordered by Judge Gould, stripped the house, removed fix-
tures from the walls, and took all property acquired during the 
marriage, down to and including the Plaintiff's hunting rifle, 
his mother's ring and a silver heirloom spoon, all telephone 
books and the cable t.v. connectors. (TR 35) The Defendant 
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left furniture owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage, a 
dining room set the Plaintiff had purchased shortly after 
marriage with funds he had acquired prior to marriage, and nomi-
nal other personal property. (TR-35) Judge Wahlquist, who 
heard the matter relating to the division of property found that 
the acts of the Defendant were in "contemptuous disregard 
of the order of Judge Gould. He ordered the Defendant to return 
but 5 items and awarded the Defendant the remaining personal 
property in lieu of alimony or attorney's fees. (see the minute 
entry of the District Court) The Defendant on two occasions 
waived alimony. (TR-111) "I do not want support from Mr. 
Preston". (TR-138) Q. Okay. Just so I understand, you are not 
asking for alimony in this divorce, is that correct? A. That's 
correct. 
In the year 1975 the Plaintiff commenced construction of a 
cabin at Bear Lake upon land owned (TR-27) by Plaintiff and his 
brother as tenants in common. (See Exhibit 7) The total cost 
of the construction was $18,918.38. $9,310.93 was contributed 
by Plaintiff to construction by reason of the sale of assets 
owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage consisting of stocks 
and the trailer house that was on the property at the time of 
marriage. The balance of $9,607.45 came from the earnings 
generated by the Plaintiff during the three year period of 
construction. The Defendant did not contribute to the 
construction of the cabin from her own funds held prior to 
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marriage or from the income of said funds or from funds 
collected by the Plaintiff for the Defendant during marriage 
or the income from the funds. (TR-30-39) The Defendant stated 
she wanted no part of the Bear Lake property, that she never 
asked Plaintiff to put her name on the deed "and, I told him at 
the time that I wanted no part of that". (TR-84) The Defendant 
claims a work contribution in the cabin as it was a family pro-
ject and that the children of both parties participated in the 
construction. (TR-90) The cabin was valued by the appraisers in 
the neighborhood of $34,000.00 and the Trial Court arrived at 
that figure as the market value of the cabin. 
The Trial Court held by minute entry as follows: "The 
chief property that was acquired during the marriage was the 
construction of a home on his property at Bear Lake." The court 
in its findings stated as follows: "During the marriage acting 
as a family, and drawing on their earnings, and daily funds of 
all, the family constructed a cabin on the Plaintiff's land." 
The Trial Court granted the Defendant a lien of $17,000.00 on 
the cabin to be paid by the Plaintiff within 18 months. The 
Trial Court in its findings of fact and its conclusions of law 
failed to mention the $9,310.93 contribution made by the 
Plaintiff from prior owned funds to the construction and failed 
to give the Plaintiff credit for the construction. 
The Defendant, following the death of her father in August, 
1977, inherited farm land situated immediately west of Logan, 
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Utah. (TR-90) This land was, during the marriage of the 
parties, annexed to the city limits of Logan City. The 
Defendant's mother at the time of the setlement of the estate 
deeded additional land to the Defendant and her brother. 
(TR-91) The transfer also included two bulls, 42 cows and 
their offspring, Taylor grazing permits and a building lot in 
Logan City. The Plaintiff, an attorney, aided the family in the 
administration of the estate, including the preparation of 
estate tax returns. (TR-42) A substantially reduced fee was 
charged for the purpose of offsetting only the expenses of the 
law firm as the Plaintiff considered the property an acquisition 
by the family. (TR-42) The building lot was measured and deeds 
prepared by the Plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining deeds 
from the Defendant's mother to the Defendant. (TR-42) 
Following the acquisition of the farm land, the Plaintiff help~ 
with the harvest of the crops, helped feed the cattle and 
transport them from summer range. (TR 43-69) He helped fence 
the east and west boundaries of the property (TR-43) and 
Plaintiff would have requested his statutory share of the pro-
perty had Defendant died during the marriage. (TR-43) 
The Defendant does not deny Plaintiff's participation in 
the farm work but comments that "he did come out once in a while 
after work. He was drinking and he caused alot of problems and 
great dissension, and finally he was asked not to go back around 
the property any more." (TR-99) The Defendant did not deny 
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however Plaintiff's participation in the acquisition of the pro-
perty through the administration of the estate, his preparation 
of deeds for the acquisition of the property from the 
Defendant's mother, the fencing and transportation of the 
cattle. 
The appraiser, Mr. Lynn Balls, stated that the highest and 
best use of the property would be for commercial and industrial 
purposes. (TR-20) His valuation, based upon facts at the time 
of the entry of the divorce decree, results in a value to the 
Defendant of $161,850.00. (and a similar value attributed to 
her brother). (TR-4) December 23, 1980 values were between 
$11,000.00 and $20,000.00 per acre with a confirmed sale less 
than 4 blocks away of comparable land of $12,000.00 per acre. 
(TR-153) yielding a net appraised value of $526,600.00 and a 
one-half interest value of $262,800.00 in the name of the 
Defendant. Added to that figure would be the cattle, and the 
building lot in the amount of $16,645.00 (Exhibit 6) all of 
which was acquired during marriage. 
During the marriage the Defendant received substantial 
income from the investment of assets acquired during the 
marriage as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 8. This income was 
retained by the Defendant while the parties maintained them-
selves on the income earned by the Plaintiff. The uncontro-
verted facts show the Defendant's earned income of at least 
$14,180.00 acquired by her during the marriage was not con-
sidered by the Trial Court in arriving at the property 
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distribution, yet the Trial Court concluded that the Plaintiff's 
(husband's) wages were "their earnings and daily funds of all". 
The Trial Court further found that the PARTIES enhanced 
interests in both real and personal properties during marriage, 
and from these findings the Trial Court concluded as follows: 
Except as hereinafter specifically provided, each of the 
parties should be awarded all of the real and/or personal pro-
perties they owned or had interest in prior to their marriage, 
or that inherited during the marriage. 
The Trial Court's division of the property acquired during 
marriage resulted in an award to the Plaintiff (husband) 
approximately 10% of the total properties acquired during 
marriage and a distribution of 90% to the Defendant, wife. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
THE DEFENDANT A ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE CABIN AT BEAR LAKE. 
The Trial Court said in its minute entry that each party 
shall have all of the property they had before their marriage. 
The Findings of Fact reflect this concept and further find that 
during the marriage, the parties enhanced interests in both real 
and personal properties. 
Exhibit 7 shows the history of the Bear Lake Cabin and 
shows that there was a contribution to the construction costs of 
the cabin by Plaintiff from prior owned assets of approximately 
50% of the construction costs. The Trial Court ignored not on~ 
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the content of the exhibit but also the testimony of the 
Plaintiff as to this contribution. (TR 38) Had the Court con-
sidered this fact, the equity would have been only one half of 
the net value of the cabin and the Defendant's lien should have 
then have been in the amount of $8,500.00 instead of $17,000.00. 
This Court as recently as March 2, 1981 in the case of 
Georgedes vs. Georgedes, #17073, approved the concept of allo-
cating to each party the property he or she brought into the 
marriage. The Trial Court in the present case for reasons not 
found in the Findings of Fact first announced that each shall 
have all property they had before marriage then failed to give 
the Plaintiff credit for this expenditure. 
This is not the first time that this Trial Court has failed 
to give a party credit for an expenditure of funds owned prior 
to marriage. In 1974 the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of 
Humphreys vs. Humphreys, Utah 520 P2d 193, in which the same 
Trial Court that heard the present case directed that the home 
of the parties be sold and that the remaining equity, after 
payments of debts, should be divided equally between the 
parties. The Trial Judge in Humphreys, as in this case, failed 
to give Plaintiff credit for $3,400.00 received from a pre-
viously owned home and the Supreme Court speaking through 
Justice Crockett said: 
" ••••• it is our conclusion that it would be equitable 
and just that the Plaintiff's $3,400.00, which was used 
as a downpayment to purchase their family home, should 
be reimbursed to her, and that it should be a preferred 
claim on the proceeds realized from the sale •••• " 
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The facts of the Humphreys case are virtually the same as 
in the present case except for the fact that there were children 
born to the Humphreys' marriage. The Supreme Court modified the 
decision of the Trial Court in Humphreys to correct the omission 
of the Trial Court and similar relief is sought in the present 
case. The Plaintiff now asks this Court to modify the decision 
of the Trial Court and to reimburse the Plaintiff for his 
contribution to the Cabin from funds owned prior to marriage. 
In the case of Jesperson vs. Jesperson, No. 16513 decided 
March 20, 1980, 610, P2d, 326, this Court stated the criteria 
for the making of an equitable property division. The Trial 
Court may consider the length of the mar~iage and the parties' 
respective contributions to the marriage. 
"It is not unreasonable for the court to permit 
the Plaintiff to withdraw from the marital property 
the equivalent of those assets Plaintiff brought 
into the marriage. All that may be considered to 
be marital property acquired through the joint 
efforts of the parties was therefore the proceeds 
from the sale of the St. George home over and 
above its purchase price of $19,027.00". 
"Where the marriage is of short duration and 
neither party has forgone employment opportunities, 
the amount of each parties' contribution to assets 
acquired during the .. marriage is a more important 
factor in formulating an equitable property 
division than it would be after a long-term 
marriage where one spouse relinquished employ-
ment to case for the family •.•.••..•. while both 
parties should share in the increase in value of 
marital assets, the general approach in dividing 
property after a short term m~rria~e is to_plac7 
the parties as nearly as possible in the f1nanc1al 
position they would have held if no marriage had 
taken place." 
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The decision of the Trial Court, as rendered, awards the 
Defendant one-half of Plaintiff's contribution in the amount of 
$4,655.46, plus the appreciation on that amount through 
inflation. This is clearly an inequitable result taking into 
consideration the Trial Court's finding that each party was 
awarded the property they held prior to marriage. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
AWARDING THE PLAINTFF A ONE-HALF INTEREST IN AND TO THE FARM 
LAND, ANIMALS AND BUILDING LOT ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING 
THEIR MARRIAGE. 
The Trial Court in its minute entry said with respect to 
the farm land "each party shall have all of the property they 
had before the marriage or inherited after marriage". The Find-
ings of Fact provide that the "Defendant inherited interests in 
real and personal properties during the marriage". The 
Conclusions of Law parallel the statements with regards to the 
inheritance. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce grants to the 
parties "all real and personal properties they owned or had 
interest in prior to their marriage or that inherited during 
the marriage. 
The Trial Court therefore divided outright the total value 
of the cabin located on the Plaintiff's property and totally 
ignored, without definitive findings, real and personal property 
acquired by the parties during marriage in the name of Lorna A. 
Preston as follows: 
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A. Land valued between $161,850.00 and $262,800.00 
B. Building lot valued at $12,500.00 
C. Cattle valued at $14,270.00 
D. Grazing permits valued at $1,575.00 
E. Income cash derived by Defendant from investments 
valued at $14,180.00 
The total value of the property awarded to the Defendant by 
a stroke of the pen was between $204,375.00 and $305,325.00. 
Recent cases seem to support the proposition that a 
distinction should not be drawn between property inherited by 
a man verses a woman when the issue is the division of property 
acquired during marriage. The Trial Court saw fit to divide t~ 
property acquired by the parties during the marriage as it 
relates to property in the name of the Plaintiff yet it failed 
to divide the property acquired by the parties during the 
marriage as it related to that property in the name of the 
Defendant. 
The Georgedes and Jesperson cases, supra, deal with pro-
perty brought into the marriage and therefore had no application 
to this issue. The Defendant testified that the value of the 
property at the time of her father's death was appraised at 
$1,000.00 per acre for the 43.80 acres which accounts for an 
inherited value of $43,800.00 and increase in value of the la~ 
of $118,050.00 and $219,000.00 depending upon the appraisement 
figure used. 
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The Montana case of Vivian vs. Vivian, 583 P2d 1070, bears 
a resemblance to this case. The husband inherited about 
$13,000.00 during the marriage from his mother. The Trial Court 
deducted this amount from the assets of the parties prior to any 
division. The Supreme Court held that the Trial Court erred in 
making the decision because the Trial Court had made no specific 
findings to support the distribution to the husband. The 
Supreme Court held that inherited property was not per se 
excluded and the Court could not properly review the decision of 
the lower Court because the findings in the case lack specific 
detail, a criticism not uncommon to the present case. 
The value of the farm, the animals and the lot in the name 
of the Defendant must be considered in the settlement. McKibban 
vs. McKibban, Oregon, 533 P2d 362, found that the wife, about 15 
years before the divorce, had received title to a 160 acre farm 
in Iowa from her father's estate. The wife through a verbal 
agreement with the family agreed that the farm should stay in 
the family. The Oregon Supreme Court held as follows: 
We held that the wife's farm must be considered 
as one of the marital assets nothwithstanding 
the family agreement. 
Colorado has adopted the position that inherited property 
is not per se excluded from consideration by a court in marital 
property division. Santilli vs. Santilli, Colo. 453 P2d 606, 
where the husband argued that the increase in the value of the 
inherited land cannot be considered. The Court held that the 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
increased value is not per se, excluded from consideration by 
the Court in making a determination of the property rights of 
the parties. Following the case of Santilli the Colorado 
Supreme Court decided the case of Gaski vs. Gaski, 534 P2d 629, 
where the Court said as follows: 
"Inherited property is not per se excluded from 
consideration by a court in marital property 
division ••.•• However he must show that by his 
efforts conjoined with his wife's he either built 
up or kept the family worth intact. He is then 
entitled to the value of those efforts in a 
property settlement." 
"Each case must be decided upon its own merits." 
"He performed his legal obligation of supporting 
his family for 20 years. This included clothing, 
groceries and medical bills. It also included 
paying his own federal and state income taxes 
and paying the taxes on the ranch income once 
with a half-baked recollection of a second time." 
The Court in the Gaskie case held that the ranch had not 
lost its separate identity as the wife's property, but it must 
be remembered that it was inherited 11 years before the 
marriage. 
The State Supreme Court of Oklahoma has also addressed this 
question in the case of Hauser vs. Hauser, Okla, 460 P2d 436. 
The Supreme Court remanded the case saying: 
"The enhanced value of separate property resulting 
from the parties' joint efforts should be adjudicated 
in final settlement of their affairs, time and manner 
of acquisition being elements of consideration." 
The later Oklahoma case of Kirkland vs. Kirkland, 488 P2d 
1222 adds a further dimension to the Hauser case. There the 
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Oklahoma Supreme Court said as follows: 
In some of our cases we have treated the increase 
in value of the separately owned or acquired 
property as being jointly acquired, and have 
approved consideration of this enhanced value 
in the equitable division of the property ••••• 
However, in these cases the increased or enhanced 
value was considered jointly acquired because 
the enhanced value was due to the joint efforts 
of the husband and wife. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to rule 
on this question to the same extent as other states. However, 
in the case of Dubois vs. Dubois, 504 P2d 1380, this court con-
sidered whether or not the husband was entitled to share in the 
enhancement of gifts given to the wife by the wife's uncle. 
This Court approved the award of 40% of the marital estate to 
the husband, and reduced alimony to one dollar per year. In the 
present case the evidence reflects that the Defendant received 
substantial property through gifts and inheritance during the 
marriage of the parties. This property was appraised at 
$1,000.00 per acre for inheritance tax purposes at the time of 
the receipt but was later appraised at values of up to 
$12,500.00 per acre. The Defendant demeans the efforts of the 
Plaintiff in the acquisition of the property and the increase in 
the value of the property, yet the fact remains that the 
Plaintiff secured the acquisition of the property as a family 
asset, improved the property and the animals situtated thereon. 
Inflation and annexation into the Logan City limits increased 
the value of the property to its present status. The increase 
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in value can be attributed to each party. As with the Bear Lake 
Cabin inflation increased the value of the property. The 
Defendant shared in that property as the Plaintiff should share 
in the increase in the valuation of the Defendant's land, cattle 
and building lot. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING 
THE DEFENDANT SUBSTANTIALLY ALL OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY 
ACQUIRED BY THE PARTIES DURING THEIR MARRIAGE. 
The first judge to enter this case was Judge Gould, who 
upon hearing the preliminary matters entered a decree of 
divorce, and restrained the Defendant from removing jointly 
acquired personal property from the residence that was ultima-
tely restored to the Plaintiff. Upon separation Plaintiff left 
the home he had purchased 16 years earlier with only his shaving 
kit (TR-34) He later returned to take possession of records, 
clothes and other items. Upon the Defendant's removal of many 
i terns from the Bear Lake Cabin the Plaintiff sought and received 
a restraining order prohibiting the Defendant from removing 
items from the home that the parties had jointly acquired. 
(TR-145) The Defendant in knowing disregard of Judge Gould's 
order removed substantially all of the jointly acquired proper~ 
from the home. The Defendant says in defense of her actions: 
(TR-116) I remember that's what the papers said, but I did not 
interpret it that way because I wouldn't have been able to take 
clothes, the children's beds, nothing. Q. Notwithstanding that 
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order, you did elect to take certain property out of that home 
which is still in your possession. A. Yes. 
The Trial Court found the Defendant in contemptuous 
disregard of Judge Gould's order. The Plaintiff seeks only to 
receive an equitable portion of the personal property in an 
orderly manner and not to receive merely that portion left by 
the Defendant. Standing alone this Point as grounds for appeal 
may be de minimus and of little consequence, but taken in con-
text with the other Points it reflects the continuing failure 
of the Trial Court to provide an equitable distribtuion between 
the parties. This is particularly true in view of the Trial 
Court's award of the property to the party in contempt. 
CONCLUSION 
The decisions of this Court relating to the Appellant's 
burden have been printed so often that it is redundant to repeat 
them here, except to quote Justice Hall in the case of Mccrary 
vs. Mccrary, 599 P2d 1248, stating that a party seeking a rever-
sal of the Trial Court must prove a misunderstanding or 
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudi-
cial error, or that the evidence clearly preponderates against 
the findings or that such a serious inequity resulted from the 
order as to constitute an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion. 
Reviewing the facts of this case, in the framework of Justice 
Hall's decision, causes the following questions to come to mind: 
A. The Trial court concluded that each party should have 
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that property restored to them that they held prior to marriage, 
why then did the Trial Court award to the Defendant, one-half of 
the Plaintiff's contribution to the cabin from funds held by 
him prior to marriage? 
B. The Trial Court concluded that the Bear Lake cabin was 
constructed by the parties, "acting as a family and drawing on 
their earnings, and daily funds of all," why then didn't the 
Trial Court seek to divide between the parties the Defendant's 
income as it divided Plaintiff's income. 
C. The Trial Court concluded that the Planitiff's income 
and cabin was the income and cabin of the parties, should the 
Trial Court have also concluded that the Defendant's farm inco~ 
and assets were the income and assets of the parties, par-
ticularly in view of the fact 'that the Plaintiff supported the 
Defendant's children over and above child support and paid the 
taxes on all of the Defendant's income. 
D. The Trial Court concluded that the Bear Lake Cabin wu 
constructed by the parties, acting as a family and drawing of 
their earnings, and daily funds of all, and awarded the 
Defendant one-half of the appraised value of the Bear Lake 
Cabin, why then didn't the Trial Court conclude that the partiti 
had acting as a family and drawing upon their earnings, 
increased the value of the farm property, cattle and the 
· · d h t · the same fashion as the building lot and d1v1de t ose asse s in 
assets in Plaintiff's name were divided. 
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E. The Trial Court concluded that the Defendant was 
entitled to neither attorney's fees nor alimony and found the 
Defendant in contemptuous disregard of Judge Gould's order, why 
then did the Trial Court award the Defendant the very object of 
her contempt in lieu of further alimony or attorney's fees. The 
Defendant had on account and available to her the sum of 
$43,000.00 in cash at the time of the initial hearing. 
The Defendant, in concluding her testimony, was asked by 
her attorney what she recommended as being a fair and equitable 
settlement. The Defendant said: (TRll -221) "I would like to 
keep the property that I owned prior to the marriage and the 
property that I inherited and the things that I own, that I 
have. I would like to keep those. I think that Mr. Preston 
should ---- I feel Mr. Preston should keep the property at Bear 
Lake; I think the cabin --- we both worked very hard and built, 
and I think that that should be divided between us. Our home on 
Thrushwood Drive I would like to get the money back that I put 
--- I invested in redecorating it, the $5,000.00. I think Mr. 
Preston should take the money that he had in it prior to our 
marriage and then I think the equity between that should be, 
minus the mortgage, should be distributed between us. 
The concept is not new but time has tarnished it beyond 
recognition. What is mine is mine and what is yours is one-half 
mine. Such dogma has been uttered before but rarely taken 
seriously. The Trial Court awarded to the Defendant more than 
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90% of the total property acquired by the parties during 
marriage. In two separate cases this Court considered the per-
centage of distribution between the parties. The first was the 
case of Kerr vs. Kerr filed April 29, 1980, 610 and 1380, where 
this Court approved a 55% vs. 45% distribution to the parties 
and the second is the case of Dubois vs. Dubois, 504 P2d 1380, 
where this Court approved a 60% vs. 40% distribution. 
The Trial Court misunderstood and misapplied the law as it 
related to the total property acquired by the parties during 
their marriage. The result was substantial and prejudicial 
error in denying the Plaintiff credit for his contribution to 
the cabin from prior owned funds and denying the Plaintiff a 
one-half or equity interest in the farm, building lot and 
cattle, together with the accumulation of funds generated by t~ 
Defendant during marriage while the parties lived upon the in~~ 
and resources generated by the Plaintiff. The evidence in this 
case preponderates against the conclusions of law that the 
Defendant should be awarded valuations in excess of $204,000.00 
while the Plaintiff should be awarded valuations at $17,000.00 
less his contribution of $9,300.93. The inequity may reasonably 
be termed an abuse of discretion. The net result of Trial 
Court's decision is that the Defendant and her children have, 
for the past 8 years, been supported by the Plaintiff, Defendant 
has reaped the benefit of her acquisitions in property and cash, 
in excess of $200,000.00. She has neither paid income taxes 
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from her funds nor has she consumed them for day to day living 
expenses. 
The Plaintiff does not desire an equal division but the 
Plaintiff does desire an equitable division of the property 
based upon the sound discretion vested in this Supreme Court. 
The abuse of discretion in this case by the Trial Court oversha-
dows the shadings of fact and circumstances known only trier of 
fact and involves substantial issues of equality of the parties 
before the courts, and the right of the Plaintiff as a litigant 
to have his evidence properly considered by the trier of fact. 
MrCrary vs. Mccrary, supra. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this .;?~day of May, 1981. 
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